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Abstract—This paper brings the novel idea of paying the
utility to the winning agents in terms of some physical entity
in cooperative communications. Our setting is a secret two-
way communication channel where two transmitters exchange
information in the presence of an eavesdropper. The relays are
selected from a set of interested parties such that the secrecy
sum rate is maximized. In return, the selected relay nodes’
energy harvesting requirements will be fulfilled up to a certain
threshold through their own payoff so that they have the natural
incentive to be selected and involved in the communication.
However, relays may exaggerate their private information in
order to improve their chance to be selected. Our objective
is to develop a mechanism for relay selection that enforces
them to reveal the truth since otherwise they may be penalized.
We also propose a joint cooperative relay beamforming and
transmit power optimization scheme based on an alternating
optimization approach. Note that the problem is highly non-
convex since the objective function appears as a product of
three correlated Rayleigh quotients. While a common practice
in the existing literature is to optimize the relay beamforming
vector for given transmit power via rank relaxation, we propose a
second-order cone programming (SOCP)-based approach in this
paper which requires a significantly lower computational task.
The performance of the incentive control mechanism and the
optimization algorithm has been evaluated through numerical
simulations.
Index Terms
Cooperative beamforming; energy harvesting; mechanism de-
sign; secrecy; two-way relay.
I. INTRODUCTION
Relaying is a promising technique to extend wireless cover-
age and increase the achievable rate [1]–[4], and in recent
years it has also been recognized as a spectrally efficient
way to exchange information over distance between two
transceivers via two-way relaying [5]–[8]. Relays, if used
collaboratively, can also form focused signal or noise beams
to provide physical-layer security [3], [4], [9]. Collaborative
relays follow the same idea as multiple antennas to exploit
the spatial degrees of freedom for enhancing the signals to
the legitimate receiver and worsening the interception of the
eavesdropper by transmitting artificial noises [10]–[13].
There is a huge scope of research for selecting the best relay
nodes in maximizing the system performance. A meaningful
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setting would be to let the selected relays earn some form
of revenue for relaying others’ information. In this case,
challenge arises because the candidates may behave selfishly
to maximize their own revenues. To tackle this, game theory
is a popular tool to analyze the conflict of interests among
intelligent rational competitors [14]–[16]. Auction and pricing
schemes were proposed for efficient selection of a social
choice, but most of them were based on the assumption that
the players are honest and ready to disclose their true private
information [15], [16], which may not be the case in practice.
Also, in the literature, the “revenues” are usually some abstract
quantities that may not be meaningful [15]–[19].
Nevertheless, a recent development in wireless communica-
tions, which promotes energy transfer over wireless channels,
may be the answer to help quantify the revenues one may
gain from contributing to others’ communications. Through si-
multaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT),
mobile users are provided with access to both energy and data
at the same time which brings enormous prospects of new
applications [20]–[25]. The concept of SWIPT was first intro-
duced in [20] in a single noisy line, and later extended in [21]
to frequency-selective channels. Practical SWIPT schemes,
namely, time switching and power splitting, have also been
proposed [22], [23]. Recent studies further considered the
combination of SWIPT with physical-layer security [24], [25],
one-way relaying [26], and two-way relaying [27].
The focus of this paper is fundamentally different from the
literature. While we consider relay selection for a two-way
communication system in which two nodes exchange infor-
mation with the help of a set of relay nodes in the presence
of an eavesdropper, rather than concentrating primarily on
reaping the benefits of relaying for secrecy communications,
our aim is to develop an efficient mechanism to ensure that the
relays reveal their true private information for relay selection
optimization. In this particular problem, the channel coeffi-
cients from a relay to the two sources and the eavesdropper
are regarded as the private information of that relay. The
participation of relays is incentivised by the possible energy
earning from the sources. In particular, the source transmitters
will ensure that the energy harvesting requirements of the
selected relays are fulfilled up to a certain threshold (or the
expected payoff level).
The problem is that under this setup, the relays may exag-
gerate their private information to improve their chance to be
selected, hoping to maximize their energy earning. The objec-
2tive for a self-enforcing truth-revealing mechanism is to ensure
that the relays reveal their actual private information to avoid
being punished to pay for any damage caused. Note that mech-
anism design approaches have already been considered for
suppressing cheating in cognitive radio networks [17], wireless
video caching [18], and one-way relaying [19]. However, in
[17]–[19], the revenue was paid in terms of some virtual entity,
which does not directly relate to the concerned participants,
while in this paper, the revenue is physically defined as
harvested energy. In the context of energy harvesting facility
considered in this paper, it is assumed that only the selected
relays can harvest their required energy, and the unselected
relay nodes will harvest almost nothing. It is also assumed that
the relays will participate in the mechanism, as is common in
conventional relaying [3]–[6], even in the absence of dedicated
energy transmission. However, there is no guard mechanism
to prevent any relay from announcing its undermined channel
condition in an attempt not to be selected so it can harvest
energy without paying any penalty. In that case, the relay may
remain unselected even with a better channel condition. But
the reality is that the channel state information (CSI) of each
relay is its own private information and none of the relays
actually knows the channel conditions of the other relays.
Hence none of them can define any threshold downplaying
by which may guarantee its non-selection. Although it may
be generally assumed that any unselected relay will be able to
harvest some extent of energy, there is no guarantee that the
harvested energy would be above a useful level. Thus the key
motivation for the relays to participate in the mechanism is that
through the proposed mechanism they yield QoS guarantee (at
least minimum incentive) in terms of energy earning. On the
other hand, the unselected relays have no such guarantee.
With the mechanism, we then propose a joint collaborative
relay beamforming and transmit power optimization scheme
for maximizing the sum secrecy rate while guaranteeing the
expected payoff of each selected relay node in the form of
its harvested energy. The optimization problem appears to be
highly non-convex as the objective function is a product of
three correlated Rayleigh quotients. While a common practice
tends to optimize the collaborative relay beamforming vector
for a given transmit power using rank relaxation, our proposed
approach requires no rank relaxation. Instead, we formulate the
relay beamforming problem as a second-order cone program
(SOCP), which has lower computational overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest work in the
existing literature to this paper can be found in [19]. How-
ever, our contribution is three-fold compared to the work
in [19]. Firstly, we consider two-way amplify-and-forward
relaying, whereas one-way decode-and-forward (DF) relaying
was considered in [19]. The DF relaying vastly simplifies
the utility characterization for mechanism design. Hence the
system model is different. Secondly, we define the utility of
the auctioneers (relays) in terms of some practically appealing
quantity (harvested energy) as opposed to the virtual payment
considered in [19] and many other existing works [18]. Note
that the virtual payment system does not provide enough
incentives to the players for participating in the auction.
Thirdly, in addition to the incentive controlling mechanism
design, we develop an optimal joint transmit power and relay
beamforming design algorithm whereas [19] considered only
truthful mechanism design for relay selection. We also note
that collaborative relay beamforming problems for two-way
relay systems were studied in [3], [4] but with a fixed number
of relays, and without mechanism design and payments for
the selected relays in terms of harvested energy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system model for a two-way relay network
in the presence of an eavesdropper is described. Truth-telling
mechanism design strategies are then briefly introduced in
Section III. The joint-optimal collaborative relay beamform-
ing and transmit power optimization algorithm is developed
in Section IV. Section V presents the simulation results to
illustrate the importance of the proposed mechanism design
and we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notations—Throughout the paper, boldface lowercase and
uppercase letters are used to represent vectors and matrices,
respectively. The symbol In denotes an n × n identity ma-
trix, while 0 is a zero vector or matrix. Also, AT , AH ,
A†, tr(A), rank(A), and det(A) represent transpose, the
Hermitian (conjugate) transpose, matrix projection, trace, rank
and determinant of a matrix A, respectively; ‖ · ‖ represents
the Euclidean norm; A  0 (A ≻ 0) means that A is
a Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix; [A]i,j
denotes the (i, j)th element ofA. The notation x ∼ CN (µ,Σ)
means that x is a random vector following a complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian distribution with the mean vector µ and
the covariance matrix of Σ.
R1
R2
RK
.

.

.

E
S1 S2
First time slot
Second time slot
Fig. 1. A two-way relay system in the presence of an eavesdropper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a two-way relay network consisting of two
sources, S1 and S2, wishing to communicate with each other,
N relay nodes, {Ri}Ni=1, and an eavesdropper, E, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. There is no direct link between the two source nodes,
so communication has to be done via the relays. Assuming
the more practical half-duplex relays, the communication is
accomplished in two time slots. In the first time slot, the source
nodes broadcast their signals s1 and s2 to all the relay nodes.
In the second time slot, the source nodes decide which of those
N relays will be selected to forward their messages to the
corresponding destination nodes based on some predesigned
3mechanism which we will describe later. During the whole
process, the eavesdropper node overhears the messages from
the source nodes as well as the relay nodes. The source nodes
aim at maximizing the secrecy sum-rate by properly selecting
K ≤ N relay nodes. It is assumed that each relay node only
knows its own CSI between itself and the transmitters as well
as the eavesdropper. The relays then report their CSI to the
mechanism designer (which may be one of the two sources or
a centralized processor)1 as their bids to be selected.
The messages, s1 and s2, transmitted from the sources
need to be kept confidential to E. It is assumed that s1 and
s2 ∼ CN (0, 1), and the transmit power from S1 and S2 is,
respectively, ps,1 and ps,2. In the first time slot, the received
signals at Ri and E are, respectively, given by
yr,i =
√
ps,1h1,is1 +
√
ps,2h2,is2 + nr,i, for i = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
y(1)e =
√
ps,1h1,es1 +
√
ps,2h2,es2 + n
(1)
e , (2)
where hi,j for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , N, denote the
complex channel gains between Si and Rj and hi,e for
i = 1, 2, are that between Si and E, nr,i ∼ CN (0, σ2)
and n
(1)
e ∼ CN (0, σ2) represent the complex additive white
Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at Ri and E during the first time
slot, respectively.
In vector form, the signals received at all the relays can be
expressed as
yr =
√
ps,1h1,rs1 +
√
ps,2h2,rs2 + nr, (3)
where h1,r , [h1,1, . . . , h1,N ]
T
, h2,r , [h2,1, . . . , h2,N ]
T
denote the channel vectors between the two sources and the
relays, and nr , [nr,1, . . . , nr,N ]
T
indicates the AWGN vector
at the relay nodes. We assume that each relay node is equipped
with a power splitting device to coordinate harvesting energy
and forwarding the received signal. In particular, the received
signal at the ith relay, Ri, is split such that a ρi ∈ [0, 1]
portion of the signal power is passed to the information
forwarding block and the remaining 1 − ρi portion of the
power is sent to the energy harvesting block of the relay.
Several power splitting schemes have been considered in
the literature [22], [23] including fixed power splitting and
dynamic power splitting. In order to keep our main focus on
mechanism design, we consider fixed power splitting in this
paper. Interested readers are referred to [22], [23] for more
about the dynamic power splitting schemes.
From (1), the harvested power at the ith relay node, Ri, is
given by
Ph,i = ξi(1− ρi)
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
)
, (4)
where ξi ∈ (0, 1] denotes the energy conversion efficiency of
the energy transducers at the ith relay that accounts for the loss
in the energy transducers for converting the harvested energy
to electrical energy to be stored. For convenience, we assume,
without loss of generality, that ξk = 1, ∀k, in this paper. It
is worth pointing out that the relays do not need to convert
1Note that the same node performs the transmit power and relay beam-
forming optimization and/or relay selection operations as well.
the received signal from the radio frequency (RF) band to the
baseband in order to harvest the carried energy using modern
energy transducers. Therefore, according to the law of energy
conservation, it is assumed that the total harvested RF band
power (energy normalized by the baseband symbol period)
at each relay is proportional to the normalised energy of the
received baseband signal.
In the second time slot, Ri amplifies the received signal√
ρiyr,i by a complex weighting coefficient f
∗
i and then
transmits xr,i =
√
ρif
∗
i yr,i. Combining the transmit signals
from all the relay nodes, we have xr = Fyr where F is the
combined diagonal weight matrix in the form F = diag (f∗),
with f ,
[√
ρ1f1, . . . ,
√
ρNfN
]T
. Note that for notational
simplicity, the power splitting coefficients have been incor-
porated in the definition of the relay beamforming vector f .
It is also assumed that the channel coefficients between the
transmitters and the relays are block-fading reciprocal. The
block-fading reciprocal channel assumption has been widely
used in two-way relay literature, e.g., [3]–[5]. The assump-
tion essentially means that channels for the two phases are
reciprocal, which is based on the time division duplex (TDD)
operation with synchronized time-slot. The TDD operation
greatly reduces signalling overhead and leads to an SOCP-
based problem formulation with reduced complexity, which
we will elaborate in section IV. Thus, the received signal at
S1 in the second time slot can be expressed as
ys,1 = h
T
1,rxr + ns,1 =
√
ps,1h
T
1,rFh1,rs1
+
√
ps,2h
T
1,rFh2,rs2 + h
T
1,rFnr + ns,1, (5)
where ns,1 ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the AWGN signal at source
node S1.
Similarly, the received signal at S2 can be expressed as
ys,2 = h
T
2,rxr + ns,2 =
√
ps,1h
T
2,rFh1,rs1
+
√
ps,2h
T
2,rFh2,rs2 + h
T
2,rFnr + ns,2, (6)
and that at E can be written as
y(2)e = h
T
r,exr + n
(2)
e =
√
ps,1h
T
r,eFh1,rs1
+
√
ps,2h
T
r,eFh2,rs2 + h
T
r,eFnr + n
(2)
e , (7)
where ns,2 ∼ CN (0, σ2) and n(2)e ∼ CN (0, σ2) are the noises
at S2 and E in the second time slot.
Since s1 and s2 are known, respectively, at S1 and S2,
the residual received signals after self-interference cancellation
(typical for two-way channels) are, respectively, given by
ys,1 =
√
ps,2h
T
1,rFh2,rs2 + h
T
1,rFnr + ns,1 (8)
=
√
ps,2f
HH1,rh2,rs2 + n¯s,1 (9)
=
√
ps,2f
Hh2,1s2 + n¯s,1, (10)
and
ys,2 =
√
ps,1h
T
2,rFh1,rs1 + h
T
2,rFnr + ns,2 (11)
=
√
ps,1f
HH2,rh1,rs1 + n¯s,2 (12)
=
√
ps,1f
Hh1,2s1 + n¯s,2, (13)
4where Hi,r , diag(hi,r), hj,i , Hi,rhj,r, for i, j = 1, 2,
and j 6= i, n¯s,i , hTi,rFnr + ns,i, for i = 1, 2, and we have
used the identity aHdiag(b) = bHdiag(a). Note that each
transmission phase brings some opportunity for E to overhear
the information. Hence, combining the received signals in (2)
and (7) at E over two time slots, an equivalent multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) channel is formed, i.e.,[
y
(1)
e
y
(2)
e
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
ye
[ √
ps,1h1,e
√
ps,2h2,e√
ps,1f
H h¯1,e
√
ps,2f
H h¯2,e
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
He
[
s1
s2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
+
[
n
(1)
e
n¯
(2)
e
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,
ne
(14)
where h¯i,e , Hr,ehi,r, for i = 1, 2, Hr,e , diag(hr,e), and
n¯
(2)
e , h
T
r,eFnr + n
(2)
e .
As a result, the corresponding signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
for the equivalent transmission link from S2 to S1 can be
expressed as
γ1 =
ps,2f
Hh2,1h
H
2,1f
σ2 (fHCn,1f + 1)
, (15)
where Cn,1 , H1,rH
H
1,r. Similarly, the SNR for the equivalent
transmission link from S1 to S2 is
γ2 =
ps,1f
Hh1,2h
H
1,2f
σ2 (fHCn,2f + 1)
(16)
with Cn,2 , H2,rH
H
2,r. Thus, the channel capacities at S1, S2,
and E are given, respectively, by
C1 =
1
2
log2 (1 + γ1) , (17)
C2 =
1
2
log2 (1 + γ2) , (18)
and
Ce =
1
2
log2 det
(
I2 +HeH
H
e C
−1
n,e
)
, (19)
where Cn,e , diag
(
σ2, σ2
(
1 + fHHr,ef
))
is the equivalent
noise covariance matrix at the eavesdropper E over the two
time slots and the scalar factor 12 is due to the fact that two
time slots are required in order to accomplish one successful
transmission. Then the achievable secrecy sum rate is given
by [3], [4]
Cs = [C1 + C2 − Ce]+ (20)
where [a]+ = max(0, a). Note that the secrecy sum-rate in
(20) is the sum of secrecy rates provided by all the relay nodes.
Since all the relay nodes may not have sufficiently strong
fading channels in order to make a useful contribution to the
secrecy sum-rate, selecting the appropriate relays as helpers
can play a significant role in improving secrecy performance.
In the next section, we will focus on the mechanism design
approach in order to select the K best relays that can make
the most significant contribution.
However, since the relays selected will have greater oppor-
tunity2 to harvest energy from the received signal, all the relays
will be naturally interested in participating in the mechanism.
The issue is that some of them may intentionally exaggerate
their true information in order to be selected. We will focus
on the incentive control mechanisms so that the participating
relays are self-enforced to reveal the truth.
III. TRUTH-TELLING MECHANISM DESIGN
This section provides a brief introduction of mechanism de-
sign. A mechanism M is defined by the tuple (S, t1, . . . , tN )
where ti for i = 1, . . . , N, represents the transfer payment of
agent i (or player i)3 when the social choice is S. The transfer
payment is the compensation paid by an agent in return to
the social damage it causes to the others by being selected.
Mechanism design (sometimes called reverse game theory)
is a game theoretical tool that studies solutions for a class
of private information games in order to achieve a specific
system-wide outcome even though the agents are selfish [28].
In a mechanism, each agent reports its private information
(referred to as ‘type’ in the native literature) to the designer
that serves as the parameter of a valuation function quantifying
its bid on a specific allocation outcome and the transfer
payment. The most desirable criteria that the mechanism
designers tend to achieve are incentive compatibility and social
optimality. A mechanism is said to be incentive compatible
if truth-telling becomes the dominant (best) strategy in the
mechanism while the mechanism is social optimum if it can
ensure the maximum aggregate utilities of all the agents in the
system. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [29]–
[31] is well known to achieve these two goals. Hence, we
consider the VCG mechanism in the relay selection problem
in order to maximize the secrecy sum-rate.
A. VCG Mechanism
In the VCG mechanism, agents are the members of the
society. All the agents announce their valuations for the
auctioned items simultaneously. Hence, there is no way to
know whether the agents are telling the truth. The design
objective is to give the agents the right incentives to tell
the truth. The social choice is a set of K agents from a set
of N alternatives for K identical auctioned items. In VCG
mechanism, each winning agent must pay some compensation
(i.e., transfer payment) for the social damage it causes. The
more the damage, the higher is the transfer payoff. We will
now present the framework to quantify how much each agent
i contributes to the rest of the society if selected.
Let vi (X , θi) denote the valuation by agent i from al-
ternative X given the true information θi. We also de-
note O(θˆi, θˆ−i) as the utilitarian alternative (i.e., outcome
of the mechanism) chosen from the available set of alter-
natives based on the reported information {θˆi}Ni=1, as op-
posed to the true information {θi}Ni=1, where the variable
2Note that in the proposed beamforming algorithm, the transmitters will
transmit with sufficient power such that the energy harvesting requirements
of all the selected relay nodes are satisfied at least to equality assuming that
the relays report their true channel information.
3In this paper, the terms “player” and “agent” will be used interchangeably.
5θˆ−i , {θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1, θˆi+1, . . . , θˆN} is defined as the set of
reported information of all the agents except agent i. Also,
O−i(θˆj , θˆ−j) represents the utilitarian alternative when agent
i does not take part in the mechanism. Note that the type
profile θˆ , {θˆ1, . . . , θˆN} is an ordered list in the decreasing
manner.
The total welfare of the society (excluding i) is thus given
by
∑K
j 6=i vj
(
O(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
. If agent i were not a member
of the society, then the social welfare would be changed
to
∑K
j=1 vj
(
O−i(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
. The difference in the social
welfare with and without the presence of agent i is a measure
of how much agent i contributes to the rest of the society.
In the VCG mechanism, agent i receives a monetary transfer
payment equal to the amount it contributes to the rest of the
society. As a result, the VCG mechanism is characterized by
the following monetary transfer payment function
ti(θˆi, θˆ−i) =
K∑
j 6=i
vj
(
O(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
−
K∑
j=1
vj
(
O−i(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
(21)
=
K∑
j=1
vj
(
O(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
−
K∑
j=1
vj
(
O−i(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
− vi
(
O(θˆi, θˆ−i), θi
)
. (22)
Note that the two summation operations in (21) and
(22) are conducted within two different sets of alterna-
tives namely O(θˆi, θˆ−i) and O−i(θˆj , θˆ−j). The first sum∑K
j 6=i vj
(
O(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
in (17) includes (K − 1) terms
while the second sum
∑K
j=1 vj
(
O−i(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
includes
K different terms. Thus given a type profile θˆ, the monetary
transfer to agent i is defined by the total value of all agents
other than i when agent i is present in the system minus the
total value of all agents when agent i is absent in the system.
The value is always negative since the sum of apparently (in
absence of the ith item) highest K valuations is subtracted
from the sum of the highest (K− 1) valuations. Note that the
transfer payment of agent i is independent of its own valuation
vi. The difference of the first two terms in (22) represents the
marginal contribution of agent i to the system which is given
as a discount to agent i by the VCG payment mechanism.
It is evident from (22) that all the K winning bidders pay
a social damage recovery payment equal to the highest non-
winning (i.e., the (K+1)-st) bid, whereas a losing bidder pays
nothing, i.e.,
ti(θˆi, θˆ−i) =
{
−vK+1
(
O(θˆj , θˆ−j), θj
)
, for k = 1, . . . ,K,
0, for k = K + 1, . . . , N.
(23)
In the VCG mechanism, the highest K bidders win and the
winning bidder i attains a utility (payoff) of
ui
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
= vi
(
O
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
)
+ ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
(24)
=
K∑
i=1
vi
(
O
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
)
−
K∑
j=1
vj
(
O−i
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θj
)
. (25)
Note that the penalty method to prevent reporting false in-
formation by agent i is imposed by the transfer payment
ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
in (24) which distinguishes mechanism design
from conventional game theory. In conventional game theory,
the agents can exaggerate their private information arbitrarily
in order to be selected such that their own payoff is maximized.
But in the VCG mechanism, the transfer payment will penalize
them if they do so. Thus the selected utilitarian alternative
maximizes the sum of the announced valuations, i.e.,
K∑
i=1
vi
(
O
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
)
≥
K∑
j=1
vj
(
O−i
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θj
)
,
where the equality holds only when all the agents reveal
their true private information. Let us now elaborate the VCG
payment mechanism through a simple numerical example.
Example 1 VCG Transfer Payment: Consider five agents
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with valuations v1 = 22, v2 = 18, v3 = 15,
v4 = 12 and v5 = 8 participating in a sealed bid auction for
three identical items available for auction. Each bidder can
bid for one item only. Applying the VCG mechanism, bidders
1, 2, and 3 should win since their bids confirm the maximum
social welfare (22 + 18 + 15 = 55). The transfer payment by
bidder 1 is calculated as
t1
(
θˆ1, θˆ−1
)
=
3∑
j 6=1
vj
(
O
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θj
)
−
3∑
j=1
vj
(
O−1
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θj
)
= (18 + 15)− (18 + 15 + 12)
= −12.
Thus bidder 1 pays an amount (12) equal to the highest non-
winning bid v4 = 12 for the social damage caused by its
selection. Similarly, the transfer payments paid by bidders 2
and 3 both equal to 12. Note that the payments are consistent
with their respective marginal contributions. The marginal
contribution of agent 1 is given by
3∑
j=1
vj
(
O
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θj
)
−
3∑
j=1
vj
(
O−1
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θj
)
= (22 + 18 + 15)− (18 + 15 + 12)
= 10
which is given as a discount to agent 1 resulting in a transfer
payment of 10− 22 = −12. Similarly, the marginal contribu-
tion of agents 2 and 3 can be computed as (22 + 18 + 15)−
(22+ 15+ 12) = 6 and (22+ 18+15)− (22+18+ 12) = 3.
6Thus the utilities of the agents can be computed as u1 =
22 − 12 = 10, u2 = 18 − 12 = 6, u3 = 15 − 12 = 3, u4 =
0, u5 = 0.
Let us now assume that agent 4 announces an exaggerated
valuation of v4 = 22, as opposed to its true valuation 12, with a
desire to win. Thus the agents {1, 2, 4} win and their transfer
payments can be obtained as t1 = t2 = t4 = −15, which
is equal to the highest non-winning bid. The corresponding
payoffs of the winning bids are computed as u1 = 22− 15 =
7, u2 = 18 − 15 = 3, u4 = 12 − 15 = −3. Note that a
negative utility of agent 4 indicates that the agent must pay
additional amount from its own pocket in order to comply
with the auction rules. Now the total social welfare counts to∑5
i=1 ui = 7 + 3− 3 + 0 + 0 = 7 as opposed to 19 if all the
agents would have announced their true valuations. Thus the
VCG mechanism gives the incentives that if any of the agents
announces untrue valuation, that may damage the total social
benefit as well as its own utility. 
In the following, we apply the VCG mechanism for relay
selection in a two-way communication system in presence of
an eavesdropper.
B. VCG Mechanism for Relay Selection
We consider the channel coefficients of each relay node
with the two source nodes and the eavesdropping node as
the private information of that relay node. The relay nodes
report their channel information gˆi , {hˆ1,i, hˆ2,i, hˆe,i} to the
source nodes (or the mechanism designer) simultaneously.
Through reporting their CSI, the relay nodes actually commit
to the mechanism designer the level of secrecy rates they
can provide for the two source nodes. We assume that the
selected relay nodes must keep their commitments during
their transmission in the second phase. Although the reported
information may not be the same as the true ones, the
mechanism designer will select the relays treating them as true.
Let gi , {h1,i, h2,i, he,i} denote Ri’s true channel information
and Ci,s(gi) denote the achievable secrecy sum rate through
relay Ri. Note that the information leakage during the first
time slot is not affected by the social choice of relays and we
assume that the relays do cooperative null space beamforming
towards the eavesdropper’s channel.4 Hence, Ci,s(gi) can be
defined as a function of the equivalent two-way single-input
single-output (SISO) channel only. After removing the self-
interference, the equivalent SISO channel from S2 to S1 via
Ri can be modelled as
y˜s,1 = αi
√
prps,2h1,ih2,is2 + αi
√
prh1,inr,i + ns,1 (26)
and that from S1 to S2 is given by
y˜s,2 = αi
√
prps,1h2,ih1,is1 + αi
√
prh2,inr,i + ns,2, (27)
where αi ,
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
)− 1
2 is the ampli-
fication factor satisfying the power constraint at relay i and
4This will be elaborated in Section IV
pr is the available relay power budget. Thus Ri’s independent
valuation can be defined as
vi (gi) , Ci,s (gi) =
1
2
[
log2
(
1 +
α2i prps,1|h1,i|2|h2,i|2
σ2 (α2i pr|h1,i|2 + 1)
)
+ log2
(
1 +
α2i prps,2|h2,i|2|h1,i|2
σ2 (α2i pr|h2,i|2 + 1)
)]
. (28)
Note that by dividing the numerator and the denominator of
both logarithmic terms in (28) by α2i pr, Ci,s (gi) can be shown
as an increasing function of ps,1, ps,2 and pr. Hence during
the mechanism design phase, we obtain Ci,s(gi) assuming
ps,1, ps,2 and pr hold their maximum possible value. Thus the
utilitarian alternativeO (gˆi, gˆ−i) based on the reported channel
information can be defined as
O (gˆi, gˆ−i) , arg max
{Rk}
K∑
k=1
Ci,s(gˆi). (29)
Note that based on the definitions of the two sets O(·) and
O−i(·), the output in (29) of the proposed mechanism design
is a set {Rk} of K relay nodes.
Let us define that πi is the average harvested power (price
paid) against per unit of secrecy rate achieved by relay i. It
is worth mentioning that the unit price πi may vary amongst
the relays depending on their channel fading conditions. Thus
the utility of Ri can be defined independently as
ui (gˆi) =
{
πiCi,s (gˆi) , if Ri is selected,
0, otherwise.
(30)
Note that in the existing game-theoretic approaches adopted
in secrecy communication, the agents receive some virtual
payment usually in terms of secrecy rate or transmit power
[19], which has no operational meaning to them. However,
we propose the utility to be paid through some physical entity
(e.g., harvested energy) for the first time. In this paper, we
assume that only the relay nodes selected by the mechanism
designer can get payoff i.e., harvest required energy from the
first time slot. Although this may not always be the case
in practice, it is a valid (reasonable) assumption since the
mechanism designer selects the relays with the best channel
conditions. Essentially, the unselected relay nodes, which have
worse channel conditions as guaranteed by the proposed mech-
anism design, will harvest almost nothing. Applying energy
beamforming5 [24] at both transmitting nodes, one can fully
guarantee that the unselected relays will not be able to harvest
any energy from the transmitters’ signals. However, designing
such spatially selective energy beamforming is a complicated
task [12], [24], [27] and requires additional resources (e.g.,
physical antennas) at the two transmitters, which is not com-
patible with the system settings (single-antenna transmitters)
considered in this paper. Hence, in order to keep the main
focus of this paper on mechanism design, we would like to
leave transmit energy beamforming design as a potential future
work. Since only the selected relay nodes can get payoff, some
dishonest relays may exaggerate their channel information in
order to create greater opportunity to be selected. This may
5We do not consider energy beamforming in this paper. Readers are referred
to [24], [27] for energy beamforming strategies.
7result in an unfair selection and damage the expected payoff
of the unselected relay nodes. Essentially, this will adversely
affect the secrecy sum rate and no equilibrium can be achieved
under this condition [19], [30]. Hence we aim at designing a
useful mechanism that can assist in controlling the incentives
of the relays through imposing some penalty functions for
the dishonest relay nodes. The penalty function will ensure
that if any relay node is selected based on its exaggerated
channel information, it will pay more transfer payment for the
social damage caused from its own source of power in order
to guarantee the required level of secrecy rate at each source
node.
In order to better clarify the motivation that drives the relays
to exaggerate their true valuations (i.e., CSI in this case),
we introduce the probability of being selected affecting their
valuation decision. The higher the valuation, the higher the
probability of being selected, and so is the expected payoff. In
this context, we assume that the relay nodes do not know the
channel information of the other relays before they actually
enact their channel information but generally know that the
secrecy rate of each relay obeys certain probability density
function (0 ≤ Ci,s(gi) <∞). Thus we define the reported
valuation of Ri as
vi (O(gˆi, gˆ−i), gi) , Ci,s (gˆi) Pr (Ri being selected) , (31)
where Pr(A) indicates the probability that the event A occurs.
Accordingly, the expected payoff of Ri can be defined as
u˜i (gˆi) , πiCi,s (gˆi) Pr (Ri being selected) . (32)
Given the relay selection criterion (29), the natural incentive
of a relay would thus be to exaggerate its achievable secrecy
rate Ci,s (gˆi) to ∞ in order to get the maximum expected
payoff, which eventually increases their probability of being
selected. Hence we introduce the following VCG transfer
payment function
ti (gˆi, gˆ−i) =
K∑
j 6=i
vj (O (gˆj, gˆ−j) , gj)
−
K∑
j=1
vj (O−i (gˆj , gˆ−j) , gj) , (33)
where O−i(·) is the relay selection outcome when Ri does not
participate in the mechanism. It is obvious from (33) that if a
relay node claims a higher secrecy rate by tempering hˆ1,i or
hˆ2,i, it may have more chances to be selected, but runs the risk
of paying extra transfer payoff through spending from its own
source of power.6 On the other hand, if a relay node reports
a lower secrecy rate, it will receive a higher monetary com-
pensation but at the cost of lower probability to be selected.
Hence truth-telling is the dominant strategy in the proposed
VCG mechanism. The idea will be elaborated in Section V
6The exact mechanism to implement this will be discussed in Section IV.
through numerical examples. In the VCG mechanism based
relay selection algorithm, the total payoff of Ri is given by
ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) = vi (O (gˆi, gˆ−i) , gi) + ti (gˆi, gˆ−i)
=
K∑
j=1
vj (O (gˆj , gˆ−j) , gj)
−
K∑
j=1
vj (O−i (gˆj, gˆ−j) , gj) . (34)
The following theorem describes the strength of the VCG
mechanism for relay selection.
Theorem 1: Announcing truthfully, i.e., gˆi = gi is a
dominant strategy for each relay i.
Proof: We need to prove that announcing gˆi = gi is the
best strategy for relay i no matter what other relays announce.
If relay Ri announces gˆi and others announce gˆ−i, then accord-
ing to (34), Ri’s utility is ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) = vi (O(gˆi, gˆ−i), gi) +∑K
j 6=i vj (O(gˆj , gˆ−j), gj)−
∑K
j=1 vj (O−i(gˆj , gˆ−j), gj). Relay
i has to decide which gˆi to announce; however, it cannot
determine O−i(gˆj , gˆ−j) since it is excluded from that society.
Hence, we can ignore the last term in ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) as it
is unaffected by Ri’s announcement. Therefore, in order to
maximize its own payoff, relay Ri aims to maximize the total
utility of the society inclusive of itself. Since relay Ri cannot
choose other relays’ announcements, it can only play its own
part. That is, by truthfully announcing, gˆi = gi, it can ensure
that O(gi, gˆ−i) will be chosen. Hence announcing truthfully
is the best thing relay Ri can do. 
Note that each relay node competing to be selected will have
the same incentive to report its true CSI and the K relays that
can achieve the top K secrecy rates will be selected which
will eventually maximize the total payoff. Thus equilibrium is
achieved under this condition.
Interestingly, the only additional task for implementing
the proposed mechanism in relay selection, as opposed to
conventional relay selection, is the calculation of the transfer
payments, which involves simple mathematical operations. In
return, the benefit is that the mechanism enforces the relays
to reveal their true CSI. No additional signalling is needed
since the node performing the optimization and/or relay selec-
tion can effectively implement the mechanism. A quantitative
comparison of benefits has been provided in Example 1.
As demonstrated in the example, if agent 4 announces an
exaggerated valuation, the total social welfare counts to 7 as
opposed to 19 if all the agents would have announced their
true valuations. Thus the VCG mechanism gives the incentives
that if any of the agents announces untrue valuation, that may
damage the total social benefit as well as its own utility.
Once the best relays are selected based on their reported
channel information, the optimization of the transmit power
and cooperative relay beamforming is conducted, which we
discuss in the next section.
IV. OPTIMAL TRANSMIT POWER AND RELAY
BEAMFORMING DESIGN
In this section, we propose transmit power and cooperative
relay beamforming optimization schemes assuming that full
8CSI of all the nodes is available. Although in some practical
communication systems, obtaining the eavesdropper’s CSI
can be very difficult (or even impossible), for the ease of
exposition, we assume that the relays know their channels
with the transmitters as well as the eavesdropper. This is a
reasonable assumption for scenarios where the eavesdropper
is an active user of the system, and the transmitter aims
to provide different services to different types of users. For
such active eavesdroppers, the CSI can be estimated from
the eavesdropper’s transmission. Let us define Pb,i , Ph,i −
|fi|2
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
)
as the net power to be
stored in the battery of the ith relay. The overall objective is to
increase C1 and C2 as well as Pb,i as much as possible while
keeping Ce as small as possible under peak power constraints
at the two transmitters as well as each relay node. Hence we
formulate the following optimization problem
max
ps,1,ps,2,f
[C1 + C2 − Ce]+ +min
i
Pb,i (35a)
s.t. Ph,i ≥ ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) , for i = 1, . . . ,K, (35b)
|fi|2
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
) ≤ pr,
for i = 1, . . . ,K, (35c)
ps,1 ≤ Pmax, ps,2 ≤ Pmax. (35d)
Here Pmax and pr are the available power budgets at the
two sources and each of the relay nodes, respectively. Note
that the last term in (35a) indicates the saved power of the
worst selected relay. In general, it may happen that Pb,i is
negative, which essentially means that the ith selected relay
may need to contribute additional power from its own storage
in order to maintain its reported secrecy rate. However, the
constraint (35b) ensures that each of the selected relays gets
its appropriate payoff. To guarantee that the relay nodes
do not need to use their own source of power, they may
set pr ≤ ui (gˆi, gˆ−i). Then the constraints (35b) and (35c)
jointly guarantee that the honest selected relays can harvest
sufficient energy required for their transmission in the second
phase. However, there is no guarantee that a dishonest relay
will be able to harvest appropriate amount of energy since
they likely have weaker fading channels than what they have
reported. Since we assume that the selected relays transmit
with sufficient power during the second phase such that their
promised secrecy rates at two sources are maintained, only
the honest relay nodes do not need to utilize their own source
of power. Although ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) can assume any value in
a general sense, we obtain ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) from (34) assuming
ps,1 = ps,2 = Pmax.
Note that the objective function in (35a) includes the product
of three correlated Rayleigh quotients, which is neither convex,
nor concave, and is in general very difficult to solve. However,
a more tractable but suboptimal strategy for designing beam-
forming is to choose the beamforming vector lying in the null
space of the eavesdropper’s channel in the second time slot.
The corresponding beamforming optimization problem is to
maximize the sum rate achieved at two sources instead of
sum secrecy rate. Because we cannot cancel the information
rate leakage to the eavesdropper during the first time slot, the
impact of the eavesdropper’s achievable information rate on
the secrecy sum rate should be considered when optimizing
the beamforming vector as well as two source powers. As
such, we can try to degrade the eavesdropper’s interception
by constraining its maximum allowable information rate with
a predetermined level re, which can help avoid dealing with
the rate difference of concave functions in (35a). If the relay
nodes choose the beamforming vector f lying in the null
space of the eavesdropper’s equivalent channel vectors, then
the information leackage in the second phase is completely
eliminated, i.e., fH h¯1,e = f
H h¯2,e = 0 so that the second row
of He in (14) can be eliminated. Thus Ce reduces to
Ce =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ps,1|h1,e|2 + ps,2|h2,e|2
σ2
)
. (36)
Introducing a real-valued slack variable ν, we reformulate
problem (35) as
max
ps,1,ps,2,f ,ν
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ps,2f
Hh2,1h
H
2,1f
σ2 (1 + fHCn,1f)
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ps,1f
Hh1,2h
H
1,2f
σ2 (1 + fHCn,2f)
)
+ ν (37a)
s.t.
1
2
log2
(
1+
ps,1|h1,e|2 + ps,2|h2,e|2
σ2
)
≤re(37b)
(1− ρi)
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
) ≥ ui
× (gˆi, gˆ−i) , for i = 1, . . . ,K, (37c)
|fi|2
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
) ≤ pr,
for i = 1, . . . ,K, (37d)
Pb,i ≥ ν, for i = 1, . . . ,K, (37e)
ps,1 ≤ Pmax, ps,2 ≤ Pmax, (37f)
where f = H¯†e f¯ , f¯ is any vector, H¯
†
e is the projection matrix
onto the null space of H¯e ,
[
h¯1,e, h¯2,e
]
, the columns of which
constitute the orthogonal basis for the null space of H¯e. Note
that from (37d), the transmit power of the ith relay node can
be expressed as
[
ffH
]
i,i
[Rs]i,i with Rs = ps,1H1,rH
H
1,r +
ps,2H2,rH
H
2,r + σ
2IK . Also, for given ps,1 and ps,2, we can
see from (37) that (37b), (37c), and (37f) are irrelevant to f .
However, the problem is still non-convex since the objective
function is not concave. Hence we split the objective function
and formulate the following relay beamforming optimization
problem
max
f ,r0,ν
r0 + ν (38a)
s.t.
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ps,2f
Hh2,1h
H
2,1f
σ2 (1 + fHCn,1f)
)
≥ βr0 (38b)
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ps,1f
Hh1,2h
H
1,2f
σ2 (1 + fHCn,2f)
)
≥(1−β)r0(38c)[
ffH
]
i,i
[Rs]i,i ≤ pr, for i = 1, . . . ,K, (38d)(
1− ρi −
[
ffH
]
i,i
)
[Rs]i,i ≥ ν,
for i = 1, . . . ,K, (38e)
where r0 is the objective value for the sum rate in (37a)
and β ∈ [0, 1] is the rate splitting coefficient. The optimal
9solution of the problem can be found in two steps. First we
solve problem (38) for a feasible r0 to obtain f . Then we
perform a one-dimensional search on β to find the maximum
r0 for which problem (38) is feasible. The lower bound of
the rate search is definitely 0. However, to define the upper
bound rmax, we first decouple the two-way relay channel into
two one-way relay channels and obtain the rate ri of each
one-way channel. Then the upper limit can be defined as
rmax = 2 × max(r1, r2). Let us now substitute f = H¯†e f¯
in (38) to obtain
max
f¯ ,r0,ν
r0 + ν (39a)
s.t.
f¯HH¯†He h2,1h
H
2,1H¯
†
e f¯
1 + f¯HH¯†He Cn,1H¯
†
e f¯
≥ σ
2
ps,2
(
22βr0 − 1) , (39b)
f¯HH¯†He h1,2h
H
1,2H¯
†
e f¯
1 + f¯HH¯†He Cn,2H¯
†
e f¯
≥ σ
2
ps,1
(
22(1−β)r0−1
)
,(39c)[
H¯†e f¯ f¯
HH¯†He
]
i,i
[Rs]i,i≤pr, for i = 1, . . . ,K,(39d)(
1− ρi −
[
H¯†e f¯ f¯
HH¯†He
]
i,i
)
[Rs]i,i ≥ ν,
for i = 1, . . . ,K. (39e)
Problem (39) is a non-convex quadratically constrained
quadratic programming (QCQP) problem which is NP -hard
in general. We reformulate problem (39) as follows:
max
f¯ ,r0,ν
r0 + ν (40a)
s.t.
∣∣f¯HH¯†He h2,1∣∣2 ≥ η1
∥∥∥∥
[ √
Cn,1H¯
†
e f¯
1
]∥∥∥∥2 , (40b)
∣∣f¯HH¯†He h1,2∣∣2 ≥ η2
∥∥∥∥
[ √
Cn,2H¯
†
e f¯
1
]∥∥∥∥2 , (40c)∣∣∣H¯†(i)e f¯ ∣∣∣2 ≤ pr[Rs]i,i , for i = 1, . . . ,K, (40d)∣∣∣H¯†(i)e f¯ ∣∣∣2≤1−ρi− ν[Rs]i,i , for i = 1, . . . ,K,(40e)
where η1 , σ
2
(
22βr0 − 1) /ps,2, η2 ,
σ2
(
22(1−β)r0 − 1) /ps,1, √Cn,i is the element-wise square
root of Cn,i, and H¯
†(i)
e indicates the ith row of H¯†e. Since
the constraints in (40) are expressed in terms of Euclidean
vector norms, multiplying the optimal f¯ by an arbitrary phase
shift ejφ will not affect the constraints. Also, by definition,
h2,1 and h1,2 yield identical numeric value. Therefore,
f¯HH¯†He hi,j can be considered as a real number, without loss
of generality. Consequently, (40) can be rewritten as
max
f˜ ,r0,ν
r0 + ν (41a)
s.t.
∥∥∥C˜n,1f˜∥∥∥ ≤ 1√
η1
h˜H2,1 f˜ , (41b)∥∥∥C˜n,2f˜∥∥∥ ≤ 1√
η2
h˜H1,2 f˜ , (41c)∣∣∣h˜He,if˜ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
pr
[Rs]i,i
, for i = 1, . . . ,K, (41d)
∣∣∣h˜He,if˜ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
1−ρi− ν
[Rs]i,i
, for i = 1, . . . ,K,(41e)
where f˜ ,
[
f¯T , 1
]T
, h˜Hi,j =
[(
H¯†He hi,j
)H
, 0
]
, h˜e,i =[
H¯
†(i)
e , 0
]T
, and C˜n,i =
[ √
Cn,iH¯
†H
e 0
0 1
]
. Note that
(41) is a standard SOCP problem which can be efficiently
solved by interior point methods [32]. Once the optimal relay
beamforming vector f is obtained, we formulate the following
problem using the monotonic property of the log function to
find the optimal ps,1 and ps,2:
max
ps,1,ps,2,ν
µ1ps,1 + µ2ps,2 + ν, (42a)
s.t. ps,1|h1,e|2 + ps,2|h2,e|2 ≤ σ2
(
22re − 1) , (42b)
(1− ρi)
(
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
)
≥ ui (gˆi, gˆ−i) , for i = 1, . . . ,K, (42c)
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2 ≤ pr|fi|2 ,
for i = 1, . . . ,K, (42d)(
1− ρi − |fi|2
) (
ps,1|h1,i|2 + ps,2|h2,i|2 + σ2
)
≥ ν, for i = 1, . . . ,K, (42e)
ps,1 ≤ Pmax, ps,2 ≤ Pmax, (42f)
where µi =
f
H
hi,jh
H
i,jf
σ2(1+fHCn,j f)
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The problem
(42) is convex for given ρi and hence the globally optimal
solution can be easily obtained using existing solvers [33].
Thus we update the relay beamforming vector f and the
transmit powers ps,1 and ps,2 alternatingly. Since we solve a
convex subproblem at each step of the alternating algorithm,
the objective function can either increase or maintain, but
cannot decrease at each step of the algorithm. A monotonic
convergence follows directly from this observation. The algo-
rithm is summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
PROPOSED ALTERNATING ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING PROBLEM (35)
Step Action
1 Initialize ps,1 = ps,2 = pr =
Pmax
K+2
.
2 Repeat
a) Solve the SOCP problem (41) using existing solvers,
e.g., CVX [33].
b) Solve the linear programming problem (42).
3 Until convergence
A. Complexity of the Algorithm
We now focus on the computational complexity of the
proposed optimization scheme. We analyze the complexity
of the alternating algorithm step-by-step. Note that the relay
beamforming optimization problem (41) involves only SOC
constraints, and hence can be solved using standard interior-
point methods (IPM) [34, Lecture 6]. Therefore, we can use
the worst-case computation time of IPM to analyze the com-
plexity of the proposed method. Now the overall complexity of
the IPM for solving an SOCP problem containing p constraints
consists of two components:
a) Iteration Complexity: The number of iterations required
to reach an ǫ-accurate (ǫ > 0) optimal solution is in the
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order of ln(1/ǫ)
√
β(K), where β(K) = 2p is known to
be the barrier parameter.
b) Per-Iteration Computation Cost: A system of n linear
equations is required to be solved in each iteration where
n is the number of decision variables. The computation
tasks include the formation of the coefficient matrix H
of the system of linear equations and the factorization of
H. The cost of forming H sums on the order of κfor =
n
∑p
j=1 k
2
j , kj is the dimension of the jth cone, while the
cost of factorization is on the order of κfac = n
3 [34].
Thus the overall computation cost for solving the problem
using IPM is on the order of ln(1/ǫ)
√
β(K)
× (κfor + κfac). Using these concepts, we can now analyze
the computational complexity of problem (37). Note that the
number of decision variables n is on the order of K (ignoring
the slack variables). Now, the problem (37) has p = (2K +
2) SOC constraints. Thus the complexity of solving problem
(37) is on the order of 4K
√
(K + 1)O(K)[(K +1)2+K2+
1] ln(1/ǫ).
In the next step of the algorithm, problem (42) is solve,
which is a linear programming problem. Now the linear
program (42) can be solved in polynomial time at a worst-
case complexity of O (33.5(3K + 3)2) [35].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed
mechanism design and joint source-relay optimization algo-
rithm for a two-way relay system through numerical simula-
tions. We simulate a flat Rayleigh fading environment where
the channel coefficients are randomly generated as zero-mean
and unit-variance complex Gaussian random variables. The
noise variance σ2 is assumed to be unity. For simplicity, the
power splitting coefficient ρi, ∀i, is fixed at 0.5.
In the first few examples, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of the VCG mechanism in self-enforcing truth-telling. Then we
provide performance comparison of the proposed joint trans-
mit power and cooperative relay beamforming optimization
with some conventional schemes.
For the demonstration of the mechanism design examples,
we assign randomly generated values vi(gi) instead of cal-
culating Ci,s, ∀i, which does not affect the relay selection
mechanism. It is assumed that although relay i does not know
other relays’ reported valuation, it knows that every reported
value v−i(g−i) obeys the probability density function e
−xi
where the random variable xi , v−i(g−i), xi ∈ [0,∞) and∫ +∞
0
e−xidxi = 1. For simplicity, it is assumed that the price
paid per unit of secrecy rate is πi = 1, ∀i.
In Fig. 2, we illustrate how the VCG mechanism
works using randomly generated true values of xi’s as
{1.1101, 1.4321, 0.4567, 0.3690, 0.8421} where the mecha-
nism is to select K = 3 relays from N = 5 alternatives.
The payoff of each relay node is plotted versus reported xi
values. Note that if all the relays report their true values, then
R1, R2, and R5 will be selected and they get their maximum
payoff at their true reported values of 1.1101, 1.4321, and
0.8421. It can be observed from Fig. 2 that both R1, R2, and R5
start receiving positive payoff only after their reported values
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Fig. 2. Payoff in terms of harvested power (W) versus reported value xi
using VCG mechanism.
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Fig. 3. Actual payoff of the relays versus reported value of R3.
exceed the highest of the unselected relays’ reported values
since their selection is not guaranteed otherwise. Also, if either
R3 or R4 reports a value higher than that of R5 (0.8421), it will
be selected instead of R5. At that point, the selected relay gets
a negative payment which indicates that it needs to use its own
source of transmit power for relaying the signal, since it cannot
harvest sufficient power due to a poorer actual channel. It is
also evident from Fig. 2 that as long as a relay is not selected,
it gets (or pays) nothing.
In the next example, we show the effect of exaggerated
reported value by a particular relay (R3) which is likely to
be unselected based on its true channel information assuming
that other relays report their true information. Results in Fig. 3
illustrate the fact that the exaggerated reported value of R3
damages not only its own payoff if selected, but also that of
the other relay nodes, which essentially damages the overall
system payoff. As discussed in Section III-A, this is due to
the fact that the exaggerated reported value of R3 keeps a
potential candidate (R5 in this case) unselected, which results
in a higher transfer payment of the selected relays. As soon
as the reported value of R3 exceeds that of R5, it is selected
but receives a negative payoff. However, the payoff of R3 is
always unaffected since there are always some higher reported
values than that of R3.
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Fig. 4. Expected payoff of each relay node versus reported value xi.
Note that the results in Figs. 2 and 3 represent the exact pay-
offs of the relay nodes without taking the probability of being
selected into consideration. Hence the payoff of any relay was
zero if unselected. However, relays may take the probability of
being selected into consideration when deciding which value
to report. That will essentially affect their expected payoff
as well. In the next example, we intend to show that truth-
telling is the best strategy for the relays through their expected
payoff where we want to select K = 3 relays from N = 5
alternatives. Results in Fig. 4 show the expected payoff of the
relays when their reported values follow negative exponential
probability distribution assuming their true affordable secrecy
rate of {1.1101, 1.4321, 0.4567, 0.3690, 0.8421}. We consider
a large number (105) of sample values to calculate the average
expected payoff of each relay node at any given reported
value. It is now more clearly indicated in Fig. 4 that truth-
telling is the dominant strategy in VCG mechanism. Any agent
can expect its maximum payoff only when it reports its true
channel information. We can also observe that the larger the
true secrecy value of a relay node, the higher the expected
payoff. Also, the maximum expected payoff of any relay node
is actually less than ui (gˆi) which is because each selected
relay node has to pay a mandatory transfer payment as a
recovery for the social damage caused by its selection.
The above numerical examples reveal that the VCG mech-
anism gives the right incentive to the bidders in an auction to
disclose their true valuation. Given the mechanism has been
implemented perfectly, we now focus on the joint transmit
power and cooperative relay beamforming optimization. In
order to demonstrate the gain achieved by the proposed
SOCP-based joint transmit power and relay beamforming
algorithm, we compare the secrecy sum-rate performance of
the proposed joint optimization algorithm with that of the
relay-only optimization and the conventional randomization-
guided semidefinite relaxation (SDR) schemes [36], [37] in
the next example. In the relay-only optimization scheme, the
two source nodes transmit at fixed power (not optimized). That
is, we solve problem (41) with fixed ps,1 = ps,2 =
Pmax
K+2 . Note
that relay-only optimization is considered for the SDR scheme
as well.
In Fig. 5, we compare the secrecy sum rate performance
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy sum rate versus maximum transmit power with
N = 8 and K = 3, 4.
of the proposed algorithm (‘Joint opt.’ in the figure) with
the relay-only optimization (‘Relay-only opt.’), and the SDR
method of relay beamforming design followed by randomiza-
tion technique (‘SDR approach’). In this example, we select
K = 3 and 4 relays from a set of N = 8 alternatives. Note
that we initialize the algorithm in Section IV with ps,1 =
ps,2 = pr =
Pmax
K+2 and update the transmit powers and relay
beamforming vector alternatingly. For updating the transmit
powers, we set the tolerable information leakage threshold
re = 1 (bps/Hz). Fig. 5 shows the performance improvement
by the proposed joint optimization algorithm compared to
the other two schemes. Since in the randomization approach,
some of the constraints may be violated, the performance
of the SDR algorithm is severely degraded. For example,
at Pmax = 10 dB, the proposed relay-only optimization
algorithm achieves more than 1 bps/Hz higher secrecy sum
rate than the randomization approach.
Finally, we show the convergence of the proposed alternat-
ing algorithm by evaluating the number of iterations required
to converge to an accuracy of 10−3. We generated four random
channel realizations (Channels- 1, 2, 3, 4) and solved problem
(35). Fig. 6 shows the convergence of the secrecy sum rate
maximization problem in different channel realizations with
an initial ps,1 = ps,2 = Pmax for N = 5 and K = 2. It
can be observed that the proposed algorithm achieves a fast
convergence in various channel scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered two-way secret communica-
tions via energy harvesting relay nodes. In order to maximize
the secrecy rate, the source nodes selected the most suitable
relay nodes from the available alternatives. The selected relay
nodes, in return, could harvest energy which is guaranteed
at least to the minimum payoff level. A self-enforcing truth-
telling mechanism design approach was adopted for the relay
selection procedure that guarantees that the relays will not
exaggerate their true information in order to be selected to
gain illegal payoff. We then proposed a joint cooperative relay
beamforming and transmission power optimization algorithm
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in order to maximize the achievable sum secrecy rate. Design-
ing strategies for dedicated transmit energy beamforming can
be an interesting future work.
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